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TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS SINCE 2007

2007
January: First arrests in
Ergenekon case
March-July: AKP closure case
September: Deniz Feneri case
November: Procurement law
amendments passed

January: Operation
Sledgehammer revealed
June: Gaza Flotilla Incident –
Gülen split
September: Turkey approves
new Constitutional referendum,
reforming judicial structures

2008

2009

2010

February: Interrogation of Chief
of MİT
March: Controversial 4+4+4
education bill passed
May: Erdoğan calls abortion
“murder”

September: Doğan Media
Group fined $2.5 billion

March: Nedim Şener and Ahmet
Şık arrested
April: Doğan forced to sell
Milliyet and Vatan
June: AKP’s third reelection
2011

2012
January: Purge of police and
judiciary
February: Internet law passed;
HSYK law passed, bill to close
preparatory schools passed
March: Twitter and YouTube
ban passed; AKP wins local
elections
April: Twitter and YouTube ban
overturned; HSYK law
overturned; MİT law passed

January: Hrant Dink murdered
March: First YouTube ban
July: AKP’s second reelection
August: Abdullah Gül becomes
president
December: Sabah-ATV sold to
Çalık Holding

2013

2014

March: Hasan Cemal fired
from Milliyet
May: Alcohol ban passed;
Cengiz İnşaat wins Istanbul
airport bid
May-July: Gezi Park protests
August: Ergenekon trials end in
convictions; Can Dündar fired
from Milliyet
October: Headscarf ban
removed
November: Erdoğan condemns
student shared housing; Bill to
close preparatory schools
proposed
December: Corruption probes
launched; 3 MPs announce
resignation from the AKP
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) promised
a new and democratic Turkey in the 2002 general elections. It promised full
implementation of fundamental rights and freedoms, reforms of corrupt institutions, a
booming economy, and the symbolic European Union membership. The Turkish citizens
remembered the past few decades of instability, mired by political corruption and
assassinations, recurrent military coups, and economic crises marked by persistently high
rates of inflation. The AKP promised change and a new era. Hopes were high in Turkey,
and the AKP succeeded in winning the votes of the Turkish people in the elections of
2002, 2007, and 2011.
Indeed, the past twelve years of AKP rule have improved the lives for many
Turks, bringing stability and prosperity. In its first term, the AKP succeeded in
establishing free and fair elections, greater freedoms for religion and media, better
relations with the Kurds, and a growing economy – a commendable transformation.
Everyone lauded the democratization process in Turkey under the AKP, calling it the
“Turkish model” for its Muslim neighbors, as it demonstrated Islam’s compatibility with
democracy. The Turkish democratic transition was to be an example for its Arab
neighbors to follow, and there were hopes that Turkey would emerge as a soft power in
the region, inspiring political reform in the Middle East.
Yet, with the prolonging rule of the AKP, this positive and promising image of
Turkey has begun to tarnish. Cracks in the Turkish democracy gradually appeared after
the AKP’s second reelection in 2007, ranging from politicized trials to media repression.

8

The situation in Turkey continued to worsen at an increasing pace under Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leading to the major Gezi Park protests last summer. The protests
shocked international observers, who completely overlooked the impact of the AKP’s
gradual but increasingly noticeable attempts at taking control. The erosion of the AKP’s
commitment to Turkish democracy was finally evident, as was Turkey’s democratic
backsliding. But where did Turkey’s democracy disappear? When did Turkey’s
democracy start to deteriorate, and how did this emerging model reverse course away
from the path of consolidating democracy?
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive landscape of domestic
events in Turkey that demonstrate democratic backsliding by identifying major issue
areas where this trend is most prominent. These key issues where democratic backsliding
becomes most apparent in Turkey are divided into five categories: media freedoms, the
judiciary, corruption and graft, the nature of the opposition, and civil liberties. These five
categories will be examined in this paper through narratives, which provide crucial
insight on the domestic political dynamics that are undermining democracy in Turkey.
The same government party that inspired democratic consolidation also prompted its
decline, and this paper highlights the strategies used by the AKP to undermine the
consolidation of liberal democracy in Turkey. Moreover, these insights yield a broader
understanding of democratic backsliding and its determinants, showing prominent areas
in the domestic sphere that need special and increased attention in order to prevent
executive attempts to undercut democratic gains. The democratic reversal in Turkey was
unexpected by many, and many are at a loss at how to respond to this decline of a
strategically crucial player in the world. Thus, the findings from the critical case study of
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Turkey can be instrumental in preventing the trend of democratic backsliding in other
developing countries.
In order to better make sense of the Turkish trend of democratic backsliding, the
theories of democracy must be examined, including theories determining democratic
transitions and democratic reversals. After examining the relevant literature, this paper
will summarize the history of Turkey’s unique experience in democratic transition,
highlighting the role of the AKP in this transition. The bulk of this paper will focus on the
five key issues areas and the AKP’s role in undermining them. This will be followed by
future recommendations for Turkey and other relevant international actors to deal with
Turkey’s domestic crisis, concluding with a discussion on the wider trends and
implications of Turkey’s democratic backsliding.

Definition of Democracy
The definition of democracy helps us better understand the processes of
democratic transition or democratic reversal. There are many definitions of democracy,
each containing certain aspects. Turkey has reached the status of an electoral democracy
but still lacks the elements of a liberal democracy, which is the culmination of democratic
consolidation. 1 Thus, this paper uses Diamond’s definition of a liberal democracy that
includes the following attributes: recurring, free, fair, and competitive elections with
alternative political parties; full adult suffrage; broad protection of civil liberties,

1

Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 34-51.
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including freedom of speech and press; and rule of law that guarantees citizens’ political
equality and due process.2

Literature on Democratic Transitions
At the end of the Cold War, literature on the triumph of democratic values and the
global trend of transitions from non-democratic regimes toward democratic ones has
dominated most Western discourse on political change. Literature has pointed to various
determinants of democratization, including processes of civil society development, rule
of law, electoral procedures, economic structures and policies, demographic factors, and
integration across socioeconomic levels. 3 Research has also emphasized the importance
of external influences in addition to specific actors, including charismatic leaders, the role
of civil society and elite pacts, and government structures.4
Most of the literature on Turkey’s democratization process has identified
Turkey’s quest for European Union membership as the main driving force. The EU
conditionality of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria has induced Turkey to comply with
democratic principles. According to research, Turkey would lag behind in terms of
human rights and democracy if it was not for the goal of attaining EU membership and its
conditionality on political and economic criteria. 5 In addition to external influence,
Türkmen analyzes the role of internal agents in Turkey’s democratic transition through
the process of elite socialization, which is composed of Turkey’s business elites, the army,
2

Larry, Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 9.
3
See: Dahl (1971); Huntington (1991); Diamond (1999); and Przeworski (2000).
4
See: Banac (1992); Brezinski (2001); Linz and Stepan (1996); Fish (2001); Ishiyama and Velten (1998);
and McFaul (1993).
5
See: Arabacı (2008); Basdeki (2012); Göksel and Güneş (2005); and Uskul (2002).
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the judiciary, and its state bureaucracy. He argues that because the conditions imposed by
the EU was adopted by the government and reflected in the state’s discourse, Turkish
elites accordingly internalized these democratic norms.6

Literature on Democratic Backsliding
However, since the mid-2000s, the democratization phenomenon has not only
been stalling, but has been reversing. International studies on democracy all confirm a
global trend of democratic backsliding. Freedom House found that in 2010 alone, twentyfive nations went backward in freedom, whereas only eleven moved forward.7 Germany’s
Bertelsmann Foundation reported that the percentage of “highly deficient democracies”
has almost doubled between 2006 and 2010.8 Research by the Economist Intelligence
Unit found that the average democracy score for 2010 was lower than in 2008,
concluding that: “Democracy is in retreat. The dominant pattern in all regions…has been
backsliding on previously attained progress.”9 Kurlantzik, in his book on democracy
reversals, identifies an important point that victims of democratic backsliding have
tended to be regional powers, such as Russia, Thailand, Kenya, Venezuela, Mexico, and
Nigeria.10
The reasons for democratic backsliding are complex and vary for each case –
giving us few definitive conclusions for democratic backsliding globally. However,

6

Füsun Türkmen, “The European Union and Democratization in Turkey: The Role of the Elites,” Human
Rights Quarterly 30 (2008): 146-163.
7
Joshua Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the World Wide Decline
of Representative Government, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7.
8
Ibid, 9.
9
Ibid, 10.
10
Ibid, 21.
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literature tends to be divided into three main categories: structural, international, and
domestic. The initial structural conditions of a country can facilitate backsliding, such as
conditions of poverty, inequality, and ethnic fragmentation. 11 Houle, on the other hand,
indicates that the existence of different levels of inequality rather than overall levels of
development can facilitate democratic backsliding.12 Moreover, it is important to note the
sources of economic wealth and the way it is managed and distributed as this provides
insight into whether the resource curse theory can be applied to democratic backsliding.
Other structural factors include demographic elements as politicizing ethnic, nationalist,
or religious conflicts can have detrimental implications on democracies. 13 It is important
to see how the politicization of identity of a certain population can impact various
democratic functions.
Just as international actors can exert positive influence on democratic transitions,
they can also have negative impacts. For example, Russia has recently demonstrated its
negative influence in Ukraine, as Russia prefers to maintain control over its neighbor and
has no interest in seeing a democracy established in Ukraine. However, even democracysupporters, such as the U.S. and the EU, can indirectly encourage backsliding due to
strategic and economic interests by staying passive and restraining from active criticism
or imposing conditionalities.
The third category of literature on democratic backsliding focuses on domestic
political dynamics. Gibler and Randazzo emphasize the importance of an independent
judiciary in maintaining democracy and argue that political manipulation of the court

11

See: Kapstein and Converse (2008).
Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy,” World Politics 61.4 (2009): 589-622.
13
See: Snyder (2000).
12
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systems is positively correlated with regime collapse across all types of regimes. 14
Kurlantzick illustrates the importance of maintaining healthy civil-military relations
through the examples of Thailand, Hungary, and Kenya, which all experienced
democratic backsliding. 15 Additionally, literature has identified ineffective and divided
opposition movements as a factor in backsliding, identifying the role of media freedoms,
education, and political attitudes that can influence the extent of strength or weakness of
pro-democratic opposition movements.

In applying the literature to Turkey, arguments for structural, international, and
domestic reasons can be made for its current democratic backsliding. Structural factors
contributing to Turkey’s democratic backsliding may include the existing religious and
secular tensions within the society and the strong nationalistic elements due to the
Kurdish issue. Internationally, one may want to explore the negative effects of the
stalling of the EU membership process and the reluctance of the United States to criticize
its NATO ally. However, this paper will primarily focus on providing evidence for
Turkey’s democratic backsliding from the domestic side, allowing readers to draw their
own conclusions. A common trend that appears from these domestic factors is the role of
the chief executives in undermining democracy by increasing its own power through
various formal and informal ways. This paper will examine five domestic issue areas,
presenting narratives to lay out the means for the centralization of executive power under
the governing AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan, who have exerted control over the

14

Douglas M. Gibler and Kirk A. Randazzo, “Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the
Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding,” American Journal of Political Science 55.3 (2011): 696-709.
15
Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat.
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media, weakened the role of the judiciary through legal constitutional changes, exploited
economic connections for personal gain, taken advantage of its ineffective opposition,
and cracked down on civil society.
On a last note, it is important to recognize that each of these issue areas are not
exclusive and are inherently interlinked and intertwined. Events such as the Ergenekon
trials have far-reaching effects that not only affect one area such as the independence of
the judiciary, but also affect other key areas such as media freedom, demonstrated by the
detention of journalists, such as Ahmet Şık.
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II. HISTORY OF TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Turkey’s transition to democracy was not a smooth process. Even after its first
competitive elections in 1950, Turkey experienced a long period of democratic
breakdowns and military tutelage. This chapter describes the evolution of the Turkish
democratic system, concluding with the democratic achievements of the AKP.

The establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 created a single party
regime that radically transformed Turkish society. The founders of the Republic
abolished the Caliphate, banned religious orders, established secular systems of law and
education that replaced the shari’a and Islamic schools, and imposed western-style
clothing. These reforms were imposed by a strong central government, despite resistance
from some of its citizens. 16 Under this cultural transformation, the Republic’s founders
aimed to eliminate evidence of its past imperial system and in its place establish and
consolidate its own regime and power based on secularism and a legal-rational basis.
In 1946 as a result of many domestic and international factors, the single-party
government made a transition to competitive politics, allowing for multiple parties and
thus, free and fair elections. In the elections of 1950, the Democratic Party won against
the Republican People’s Party (Cümhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), marking a historic
transition to Turkish democracy. 17

16
17

Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 6.2 (2005): 169.
Carmen Rodriguez et al., Turkey’s Democratization Process (New York: Routledge, 2014), 46.
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For the next three decades, Turkey experienced cycles of democracy. Each cycle
began with an election to mark a transition to a new rule. When the government’s
performance did not meet expectations, a period of turmoil followed and was preempted
by a military coup. Military intervention occurred in 1960, 1971, and in 1980, and it was
not until the elections of 1983 when there was a return to civilian politics. The
Motherland Party won an overwhelming majority under the charismatic Turgut Özal,
whose primary goal was to reform and liberalize Turkey’s economy, leading to the
privatization of many state assets and an increase in foreign investment.18
However, the election of Özal to the presidency led to polarization and
fragmentation within the party system. By 1995, the political party system was in
shambles: parties disappeared, banned parties were revived in different forms, and the
fragmented party system meant the return of coalitions. Furthermore, religiously oriented
parties began to gain strength in the political system. A series of Islamist parties inspired
by Necmettin Erbakan under his “Milli Görüş” ideology formed, one succeeding the
other as each was banned by the Constitutional Court for violating Turkey’s secularist
principle. The religious impetus finally broke through the Turkish political system when
the Welfare Party won elections in 1996, causing uneasiness among the highly secular
military. The next year, Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to resign by the military in
what has been referred to as a “post-modern coup.” In 1998, the Welfare Party was also
closed down by the Constitutional Court.19
Its successor, the Virtue Party, was also closed in 2001, but this split the party into
two parties. While those loyal to Erbakan founded the Felicity Party, another group of
18
19

Rodriguez et al., Turkey’s Democratization Process, 46-59.
Ibid, 60.
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mainly younger politicians renounced an Islamist agenda and established the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The AKP was led by Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, a former mayor of Istanbul who was convicted for making religious
references in a public speech. Having drawn lessons from the history of Islamist parties
such as the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party, the AKP managed to present
itself as being pragmatic but socially conservative. By seeking this balance and focusing
on meeting the immediate needs of the Turkish people, the AKP quickly gained political
traction and won the elections of 2002 with 34.3 percent of the vote. The national party
threshold of 10 percent prevented representation of smaller parties, yielding the AKP a
comfortable majority to dominate the government by itself. 20 The election of the AKP
into power led to a new phase in Turkish politics, marking the opportunity for democratic
consolidation.

Democratization under the AKP
During the AKP’s first term, the government concentrated on fulfilling its
promises made in the 2002 elections. The party prioritized economic growth to deliver
Turkey from its major financial crisis in 2001. Incorporating the economic policies
outlined by Kemal Derviş and sanctioned by the IMF, the government carried out large
privatization schemes, kept inflation and the budget deficit low, and successfully
attracted foreign direct investment. The economic success was exceptional: the Turkish

20

Rodriguez et al., Turkey’s Democratization Process, 60-61.
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economy grew an average 6.8 percent per year with exports increasing from $45 billion
to $107 billion during the AKP’s first term.21
The AKP’s main goal, however, was to obtain EU membership, and thus the
government took major steps to consolidate democracy. In order to harmonize Turkish
law with EU norms, the AKP made constitutional amendments for a total of 42 articles in
the Constitution,22 improving the protection of fundamental rights, bolstering the rule of
law, and limiting the military’s role in government by reforming the National Security
Council. 23 The constitutional amendments made in 2004 were one of the most significant
steps in Turkey’s liberalization and democratization process. The amendments
completely abolished the death penalty, strengthened gender equality, recognized
international human rights norms, and abolished the controversial state security courts.24
Moreover, these constitutional amendments were accompanied by a series of reform
packages, known as “harmonization laws.” These were passed between 2002 and 2004
and amended 218 articles of 53 laws, addressing issues of freedom of speech, assembly,
religion, minority rights, and prevention of torture and mistreatment.25
Impressed by Turkey’s accomplishments, the European Council voted to invite
Turkey in December 2004 to begin negotiations for EU membership. Accession
negotiations officially commenced in October 2005.26 The AKP hailed these reforms and
advancements with the EU as proof of their commitment to restore and strengthen
21

Sebnem Gumuscu and Deniz Sert, “The March 2009 Local Elections and the Inconsistent Democratic
Transformation of the AKP Party in Turkey,” Middle East Critique 19 (2010): 58.
22
Özge Zihnioğlu, European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), 114.
23
Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 73.
24
Ibid, 66.
25
Zihnioğlu, European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey, 114.
26
Ibid, 84-85.
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Turkey’s democracy. Its achievements led to the AKP’s reelection in July 2007, when it
increased its votes to nearly 47 percent.27
But the AKP started its second term with a narrow agenda, focusing its
democratization efforts on religious freedoms of its mainly conservative supporters, such
as the removal of the headscarf ban. The AKP also failed to adequately address the rights
of minority groups, especially the Kurds and the Alevis. As a result, increasing numbers
from Turkish civil society began to criticize the AKP for pursuing an Islamist agenda and
backing their own version of democracy. 28
Moreover, after the opening of EU accession negotiations in 2005, progress
decelerated, leading to a loss of reform momentum. The failure to settle the Cyprus issue
in addition to the reluctance of EU members, such as Germany and France, to enlarge to
Turkey resulted in the suspension of talks on most accession chapters. This seriously
blocked progress and resulted in Turkish perceptions that the EU was treating them
unfairly because of the EU’s desires to remain a “Christian club.” This undermined the
credibility of the EU’s conditions, causing the AKP to turn inwards to consolidate its own
power base. As a result, Turkey’s domestic reform impetus has stalled, declining enough
to start showing signs of democratic backsliding. 29

27

Gumuscu and Sert, “The March 2009 Local Elections,” 59.
Ibid, 62.
29
Paul Kubicek, “Democratization and Relations with the EU in the AK Party Period: Is Turkey Really
Making Progress?” Insight Turkey 15.4 (2012): 43.
28
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III. ESTABLISHING A MEDIA AUTOCRACY

Since the beginning of its second term in 2007, the AKP has been putting
increasing pressure on the media in order to control and suppress independent journalism
in Turkey. This clampdown on media freedom in the last seven years indicates
democratic backsliding in Turkey. A free press is crucial to a democracy, allowing for
constructive public debate while also providing accountability to the government. Yet,
rather than creating a safe and autonomous space for journalists, the government has
formed an environment that is hostile and even dangerous for journalists to report
opposing views. Moreover, the negative government practices toward news media has
primarily been led by Prime Minister Erdoğan, establishing an intimidating, powerful
media autocracy.
This chapter explores Turkey’s current state of diminishing freedoms of the press
as the government has employed different tactics to suppress the media’s role in Turkey,
including tactics of controlling media conglomerates, imprisonment, intimidation, and
firing of journalists. This chapter provides supporting evidence of the government’s
media clampdown through various narratives and events, demonstrating not only its
intolerance of government criticism, but also its fear of the media’s ability to stir antiAKP sentiments.

Controlling Media Conglomerates
During the AKP’s second term, the media landscape has seen many changes in
the ownership of media groups, specifically, into the hands of pro-AKP companies.

21

Despite these shifts, most companies have generally endeavored to remain in good terms
with the government. This is due to the fact that most of the major media holdings in
Turkey are large conglomerates with major economic interests in other sectors, such as
construction or energy, and only a small percentage of their profits actually come from
the media sector. Companies are often dependent on the privatization of government
resources and government contracts for their business due to Turkey’s state-planned
economy. In order to maintain good relations with the government to protect potential
governmental contracts, companies are under pressure to limit political criticism,
contributing to self-censorship.30 As the AKP focused on economic growth during its first
term and carried out large privatization schemes, these conglomerates were eager to
partake in this opportunity, resulting in a growing dependency on government favor.
The government has maintained influence over the media by forcing out media
groups critical of the government through heavy fines and reselling them to companies
who are sympathetic to the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan. The government in turn
rewards these companies by offering government contracts. This was the case for
Turkey’s two dominant media groups, Sabah-ATV and Doğan Media Group, as the AKP
realized after its 2007 reelection that it needed its own propaganda system to promote
itself and a way to silence critical voices from the opposition.
The Sabah newspaper traditionally supported secularism in Turkey, backing a
democratic and westernized Turkey. Yet, in 2007, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, a

30

Max Hoffman and Michael Werz, Freedom of the Press and Expression in Turkey (Washington, D.C.:
Center for American Progress, 2013), 10.
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government agency, seized Sabah-ATV for “mishandling its initial public offering.”31
Sabah-ATV was later sold to Çalık Holding, which was owned by Prime Minister
Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak, with Albayrak’s brother responsible for the media
unit. Moreover, two state banks, Halkbank and Vakıfbank, helped finance its $1.1 billion
purchase, granting $750 million in loans. Since the transfer of ownership, Sabah’s
editorial stance has also moved from being center-left to pro-government.32
The next year, Prime Minister Erdoğan used the case of Deniz Feneri (“The
Lighthouse”) as a cover to target Turkey’s largest media company, Doğan Media Group,
which was also associated with secularism since its support of the 1997 “post-modern
coup.” Deniz Feneri was a charity for the Muslim poor, founded by a group with close
ties to the AKP. However, the Doğan papers, Hürriyet and Milliyet, gave extensive
coverage of a German court case that found the charity guilty of using its donations to
buy property in Turkey. Moreover, the papers accused three Turkish citizens with close
connections to the AKP of swindling tens of millions of dollars from the charity. In
response, Prime Minister Erdoğan called for a public boycott of the Doğan papers that
reported the scandal and labeled their reporting as lies. 33 The next strike came in
February 2009: the Ministry of Finance charged the Doğan Media Group with a $500
million tax fine, which was raised that September to $2.5 billion, four-fifths of the entire
company’s market value. The fine eventually forced Doğan to sell its papers Milliyet and
Vatan to another pro-government company, reducing Doğan’s power in the Turkish

31

Oray Ergin, “The Silence of Surrender: Erdogan’s War on Independent Media,” World Affairs (2013),
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/issue/novemberdecember-2013.
32
Susan Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey (New York: Freedom
House, 2014), 7.
33
Oray Ergin, “The Silence of Surrender.”
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press.34
The seizure of the largest media groups in Turkey under AKP control marked the
beginning of the end of media freedom, revealing Prime Minister Erdoğan’s
determination to assert more control over the media sector.

Imprisonment
Turkey has the highest number of jailed journalists in the world with the
Committee to Protect Journalists reporting 40 imprisoned journalists at the end of last
year. 35 The government has used this tactic in order to silence commentary on sensitive
issues. According to a study conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe in August 2012, Turkish journalists were primarily imprisoned on charges
related to the Kurdish question and the role of the military in Turkish politics: 68 percent
were jailed due to the Kurdish issue, 13 percent due to the Ergenekon trials of alleged
coup-conspirators, and 19 percent due to various other charges.36
The high number of imprisoned journalists in Turkey is a direct consequence of
overly broad anti-terrorism laws, including Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code and
the Turkish Anti-Terror Law. For example, the Turkish Anti-Terror Law makes it a crime
to “print or publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organizations.”37 The
nature of these poorly-defined laws leave them open to abuse by prosecutors and judges,
who have aggressively applied them through their own interpretation. Even after several
rounds of reform, the anti-terrorism laws continue to target terrorist “propaganda” and are
34

Susan Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis, 7.
Ibid, 14.
36
Hoffman and Werz, Freedom of the Press, 8.
37
Ibid.
35
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enforced to prosecute any journalist trying to cover the activities of the PKK or other
terrorist groups.38
Moreover, the prosecution of journalists in Turkey demonstrates the flaws of the
Turkish legal system as well as the government’s ease in using the courts to imprison
opposing voices in Turkish society. In 2011, Freedom House reported that there are more
than 4,000 lawsuits pending against journalists in Turkey. 39

Intimidation
Another way the AKP has been clamping down on the media is through
intimidation. Prime Minister Erdoğan has manipulated the media and prevented critical
commentary for his party’s own political benefit, exploiting the fears of journalists and
media owners of losing their job and reputation. He has frequently attacked journalists
individually, including prominent journalists Hasan Cemal and Nuray Mert, who lost
their jobs after these public defamations. Other journalists have been told by their own
bosses to resist publishing government criticisms or had columns removed by the
owners.40 This pressure manifests itself in direct pressure on media owners from
government officials and more subtle forms of self-censorship from editors and
journalists who are afraid of dismissal. Many conclude that it is not worth the risk to
examine sensitive issues such as the PKK or the Ergenekon trial.
Though many of these instances of intimidation have been undisclosed, the
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climate has drastically changed in the past few months when a series of wiretappings
were leaked to the public – including the undeniable evidence of media manipulation.
Listened to by millions of Turks online, the leaks revealed a phone conversation between
Prime Minister Erdoğan and Fatih Saraç during the time of the Gezi Park protests, a
conservative businessman with close connections to Erdoğan and the AKP. In 2012,
Saraç had suddenly become the executive director of Habertürk newspaper and
Habertürk TV, both top mainstream news sources. In the leaked phone conversation,
Erdoğan furiously tells Saraç to immediately remove a news ticker on Habertürk TV
broadcasting Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli’s speech on the
incompetence of the government to intervene in the Gezi protests. Saraç replies, “Yes sir,
I apologize,” and makes subsequent calls to editors at the station to pull off the ticker.41
In the latest events, local newspapers announced that Saraç’s name was removed from the
masthead of the Habertürk daily as the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors.42
Tensions heightened a few days later on February 10, when Fatih Altyalı, editorin-chief of Habertürk, appeared on a television interview on CNN Türk. Altyalı
announced in the interview that all of Turkish media is under government pressure,
including Habertürk, creating a climate of intimidation in which media editors are unable
to publish freely. “The honor of journalism is being trampled on. Instructions rain down
every day from various places. Can you write what you want? Everybody is afraid,”
Altyalı said on CNN Türk.43
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In response to these recent accusations, Prime Minister Erdoğan has
acknowledged some intervention in the media, but has defended himself by saying that he
was slandered first.44

Firings
If warnings are not enough to prevent journalists and editors from criticizing the
government, they are fired, demonstrating the complete intolerance of the government.
Hasan Cemal, one of Turkey’s most respected journalists for the Milliyet column, was
fired in March 2013. After Milliyet published leak information on PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan and the occurring peace talks, Cemal had defended Milliyet’s actions, arguing that
the paper had the right to disclose the information to the public. In response, Prime
Minister Erdoğan publicly criticized Cemal, saying, “If this is journalism, then down with
your journalism!” This public condemnation from the prime minister created immense
pressure on the owner of Milliyet, who fired Cemal later that month. 45
The Gezi Park protests last summer also led to unprecedented mass firings,
exemplifying the AKP’s increasing suppression of the media. The total number of fired
journalists due to coverage of the protests varies as the Gezi firings have continued
throughout the fall. The Turkish Journalists’ Union reported 59 fired journalists on July
26, but other media employees cite much higher numbers. 46 When NTV Tarih, a history
magazine owned by NTV, published a special “Gezi edition,” the entire staff was
dismissed and the magazine closed down. Even after the protests in November, TRT
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news owner fired two employees who had supported the protests via social media.
However, the AKP and its supporters claim that the firings are not related to coverage of
the Gezi protests.47
Another of Turkey’s most prominent columnists, Can Dündar from Milliyet, was
also fired as a result of the Gezi protests. After his columns were not published for weeks,
Milliyet owner informed him of his dismissal in a phone call. Dündar wrote on his
personal blog, “I was waiting it for a long time, it wasn’t a surprise...I’m not the first, and
I won’t be the last.”48

47

Susan Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis, 8.
“Can Dündar dismissed from daily Milliyet for critical Gezi stance,” Hürriyet Daily News, August 1,
2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/can-dundar-dismissed-from-daily-milliyet-for-critical-gezistance.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51871&NewsCatID=339.
48

28

IV. REDEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

The Turkish judiciary has become a political tool of the AKP over recent years,
highlighting the judiciary’s undemocratic role in the Turkish political system. As the
functions of the judiciary have become increasingly monitored under tight executive
control, the independence of prosecutors and judges has eroded, undermining two
precepts of a functioning democracy: the rule of law and the separation of powers.
However, the Turkish judicial system has always been involved in Turkish politics. The
judiciary has been a central component of shaping Turkey’s new modern state after the
1961 Constitution established separation of powers between the legislature and the
judicial system. The judiciary has traditionally strictly adhered to the Kemalist ideology
of secularism. Using its own discernment, the judiciary has acted as an independent
institution to target enemies of the state, repeatedly invoking Articles 68 and 69 of the
Turkish Constitution to intervene in Turkish politics and close a total of 27 political
parties for violating the principles of a secular Turkish state.49
Yet, signs of a less independent judiciary began to appear since the second term
of the AKP. As Prime Minister Erdoğan gradually gained control of the judiciary by
installing judges and prosecutors sympathetic to his party, the judiciary has not only lost
its independence, but has become a tool to target and weaken the enemies of Erdoğan
rather than the state. However, Aslı Bali, Assistant Professor of Law at the UCLA School
of Law, argues that the notion of judicial independence must be “redefined” in cases of
democratic transitions. By using examples of controversial constitutional cases in Turkey,
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she claims that because the judiciary has been separated from accountability to elected
branches of government, it has become too independent and has aimed to protect the
interests of the elite, thus hindering Turkey’s democratic transition. 50 Yet, this chapter
will present evidence that shows the negative effects of both sides – a Turkish judiciary
that is too independent and a Turkish judiciary that is given more accountability to the
elected branch of the government, which has resulted in the AKP’s exploitation of the
judiciary for its own political purpose. The evidence provided in this chapter, however,
will focus on creating a cohesive narrative to map out the gradual erosion of the
independence of the judiciary.

The Break
The ruling AKP was not exempt from the judiciary’s target list. On March 14,
2008, Turkey’s Chief Prosecutor filed a case to the Constitutional Court to ban the AKP
and 71 of its members from politics for violating the founding principle of secularism. 51
The AKP barely survived: only six of the eleven court justices voted for closure, one vote
short to shut down a party and bar politicians according to Turkish law. On July 30, 2008,
the Constitutional Court announced its verdict but also fined the AKP $20 million, ruling
that the party had shown signs of “anti-secular activities.”52
Bali notes that this decision was a new development in the Turkish legal and
political system as this was the first time the Constitutional Court had attempted to close
an elected party in power, marking an assertion of independent authority to “close
50
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demoratic channels for constitutional reform in Turkey.” 53 However, this narrow escape
of the closure case was the breaking point for the AKP – Erdoğan had made a mental
note to find a way to check the independence of the judiciary and bring it under his
control.

Reforming the Judiciary
When the AKP first came into power, the higher judiciary structures were
dominated by hardline secularists. However, since the AKP’s landslide reelection in 2007,
there has been evidence that AKP-supporters have been integrating themselves into the
judiciary system. First, the AKP passed a law in 2007 requiring all judicial candidates to
take an oral exam carried out by the Ministry of Justice, which is dominated by the AKP.
This has helped pro-AKP appointees get into the lower levels of the courts.54
In April 2010, the Turkish parliament began to debate constitutional changes
proposed by the government. The constitutional amendments passed when voters
approved them in a constitutional referendum in September 2010. Bali lauds the
constitutional changes that were supposed to make Turkey more democratic, as the
reforms regarding Turkey’s judiciary system represent an improvement in judicial
accountability in her view.55 However, others, including Gareth Jenkins, a Nonresident
Senior Fellow with the Silk Road Studies Program and a regular contributor to its
biweekly Turkey Analyst, have questioned the motivations for the judiciary reforms,
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concerned that “judicial accountability” means increasing AKP control over a
diminishing independent judiciary. 56
The first amendment concerning the judiciary was the composition of the Turkish
Constitutional Court, which increased the number of permanent justices from 11 to 17. 14
are to be appointed by the President from a selected pool, and the rest are to be appointed
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The second amendment changed the
composition of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), also increasing its
size and putting it under increased control of the executive through the minister of justice
and the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, who retain their seats on the board.
Furthermore, the HSYK is the sole body to appoint and promote judges and prosecutors,
giving the government more expansive scope within the judiciary. 57
As a result, when the election was held in October 2010, 16 of the HSYK seats
were filled by the ministry’s 16 chosen candidates.58 Despite the democratic appearance
of these reforms, the gradual replacement of secularist judges to AKP-supporters has
ultimately allowed the AKP to exploit the judiciary for its own purposes – as seen in the
Ergenekon investigation.

Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Coup Cases
The AKP and the military have historically had tense relations. Traditionally
regarded as the protector of the Kemalist ideology, the military threatened to stage a coup
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if the ruling AKP carried out its plan to appoint Abdullah Gül as president. The AKP
defied the military and called for an early election for July 2007. When the AKP won,
Gül was sworn in as president in August, leaving the General Staff powerless to oppose
the votes of the people.59
The Ergenekon case was first launched in June 2007 following the discovery of
grenades in a house in Istanbul. However, it was not until after the AKP’s reelection in
2007 when the case gathered pace. Ergenekon prosecutors claimed to have discovered a
widespread, clandestine ultranationalist organization that had been responsible for illegal
acts of political violence in Turkey over past decades. The organization was alleged to
have plans to overthrow the current government by anti-democratic means and had a vast
network of plotters, consisting of elements of the military and police, terrorist groups,
nongovernmental organizations, gangs, journalists, politicians, and judges.60
The first high profile arrests were made in January 2008, and the resulting trial in
July of 86 individuals, including retired senior military officers, was initially commended
as a success for democracy and normalized civilian-military relations. The Ergenekon
case expanded over the years, and new evidence regarding coup plots and planned
assassinations of top officials led to further police raids and arrests. In June 2009, the
police charged active military officers, including Chief of the General Staff İlker Başbuğ,

59

Gareth Jenkins, “The Ergenekon Releases and Prospects for the Rule of Law in Turkey,” Turkey Analyst
7 (2014), http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/96-the-ergenekonreleases-and-prospects-for-the-rule-of-law-in-turkey.html.
60
Jenkins, “The Ergenekon Releases and Prospects for the Rule of Law in Turkey.”

33

after finding a 300-page document revealing a plan to subvert the AKP’s authority and
abate the influence of Fethullah Gülen’s religious social movement.61
In the midst of these trials, another military coup plot from 2003 was uncovered
in January 2010. Labeled Operation Sledgehammer, the scheme aimed to undermine the
AKP’s governance by bombing public buildings and creating border tensions with
Greece, thereby justifying military intervention. 62 326 active and retired military officers,
including the former air force and navy chiefs, were convicted in connection with the plot,
including former Army Commander General, Çetin Doğan.63
The Ergenekon case was supported and propagated by an aggressive media
campaign by pro-Gülen newspapers, television channels and internet websites. Yet, there
was still no evidence that the organization existed. The only common factor between
those charged was that they were all critics or perceived opponents of the AKP and the
Gülen Movement. In March 2011, the arrest of two renowned journalists, Nedim Şener
and Ahmet Şık, confirmed that the AKP was targeting its own critics. Şener wrote a book
in 2009 about the possible involvement of the government in the murder of Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink; Şık was writing a book on the Gülen Movement’s infiltration of
the bureaucracy since AKP’s first electoral victory in 2002. Both journalists denied any
involvement in Ergenekon and testified that their arrest was the government’s way of
retaliation for their writings.64
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The Ergenekon case finally reached an end on August 5, 2013. In this final trial,
the court announced verdicts for 275 suspects, including high-ranking army members,
journalists, politicians, and academics. 65 As a result of the five-year court case, over
1,200 people have been charged and more than 500 defendants have been convicted,
including over 350 serving and retired military staff. 66 However, this past March, former
Chief of the General Staff İlker Başbuğ, who had been given a life sentence last August,
was released from prison. Critics have speculated on his release, saying that it was a
move by the government to form a common alliance with the military against the
Gülenists. Others said the timing is not coincidental and that Erdoğan is using his release
as a distraction from his own problems with the recent corruption probe and the
wiretapping leaks.67
In summary, the AKP has used the judiciary as an effective tool in weakening the
opposition, using the Ergenekon trials to weaken the military which had initially
presented itself as a potential challenge to the party. Concerns about the fairness of the
trials led to conspiracy theories against the government, ranging from questions about the
weak nature of the evidence, the clampdown on journalists, concerns about the overusage of terrorism laws for prosecution, and the prolonged pretrial detainment of some
defendants. The Ergenekon case has demonstrated that the court trials are not determined
by the principles of due process and the rule of law, but by executive political power and
control of the judiciary.
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The Final Clinch on the Judiciary
The events after December 17 led to another clampdown on the judiciary. Not
only have hundreds of prosecutors and judges been reassigned in a purge of the judiciary,
but the AKP also proposed a new law regarding the Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors (HSYK), which was passed on February 26, 2014. The HSYK law increases
government control over appointing judges and prosecutors by granting the minister of
justice sole supervisory power over the HSYK. The law authorizes the minister of justice
to manage the composition of all three chambers of the board and to initiate disciplinary
procedures for HSYK members. According to the new law, the minister of justice needs
to appoint new individuals to the HSYK within 10 days.68 After the law was approved by
President Gül, the Justice Minister has dismissed judges, prosecutors, and the
administrative staff of the HSYK, replacing them with AKP-supporters.69 The latest wave
of purges in the judiciary was on March 23, where 271 judges and prosecutors were
reshuffled, including those who were assigned to major cases such as Ergenekon and
Sledgehammer.70
The new appointments were an attempt of the government to bring the judiciary
under its full control in an effort to cover up its allegations of graft. However, in the
aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s repeal of the Twitter and YouTube ban, the
Constitutional Court also overturned parts of the HSYK law on April 11. Erdoğan has
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criticized the judiciary saying that judges should take off their robes and “start doing
politics,” while also claiming that the court had been infiltrated by the “parallel
structure.”71
The decisions of the Constitutional Court to repeal the AKP’s authoritarian-like
rulings provide some hope for Turkey’s democracy and the future of rule of law in
Turkey. However, a healthy checks and balances must exist in order to create
accountability. Bali says that judicial independence should be redefined to convey
interdependence between the branches in order to create forms of judicial accountability.
As seen in this chapter, this is true because total independence of the judiciary has
resulted in a polarizing battle between the executive branch and the judiciary, leading to
fierce clashes as both sides try to undermine each other. However, this chapter also
demonstrates the importance of an independent judiciary to check an increasingly
authoritarian government. Moreover, there is a danger of too much interdependence, as
the AKP has used the judiciary as a tool for its own interests. Turkey must agree on the
definition of “judicial independence” in order to develop a system of accountability for
both the judiciary and the other government branches to promote Turkish democracy.
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V. BUILDING UP GRAFT THROUGH CONSTRUCTION

Ever since the AKP came into power, Turkey’s economy has nearly quadrupled.
Indeed, the boom in consumption and the construction of countless shopping malls,
residential buildings, and ambitious infrastructure projects seem to symbolize the rise of
the Turkish economy. The construction industry has been crucial to this economic growth,
accounting for over 6 percent of Turkey’s GDP and employing more than 1.5 million
people. 72 When taking the direct and indirect impacts on other sectors into account,
Forbes estimates that construction accounts for $170 billion or approximately 20 percent
of Turkey’s GDP of $789.3 billion. 73 This unprecedented growth of the Turkish economy,
supported through the construction sector, has led some to conclude that Turkey is set on
the path towards democracy through its economic liberalization.
However, this growth in the construction sector has been intertwined with politics
during Erdoğan’s years of power. As a result, transparency has dramatically declined and
corruption has characterized the growth of the construction sector. This chapter focuses
on Turkey’s increasing problem of graft, which has recently been publicly exposed in a
major scandal in December of last year. This chapter will describe the relationship
between the government and construction sector by providing examples of different
holdings which have benefited from AKP rule. It will then delve into detail of the major
December 17, 2013 graft probe and the resulting chaos it has created in the government,
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bringing into question whether Turkey has been backsliding all along as corruption has
been infiltrating politics.

The Growing Relationship between the AKP and the Construction Sector
Public construction projects have increased Turkey’s government spending by
nearly two-thirds during AKP rule, and loans related to construction have grown by 42.9
percent. Recently, Turkey’s government has launched an ambitious infrastructure project.
Envisioned to be completed in the next decade, this $200 billion construction plan
includes projects such as Istanbul’s third airport that is expected to be one of the world’s
largest airports when it opens in 2019, costing $29 billion; a 26-mile shipping canal
linking Marmara to the Black Sea, costing an estimated $15 billion; a $5 billion rail
tunnel under the Bosporus; and a third bridge over the Bosporus that will cost $4.4
billion.74
The construction sector has been managed under the oversight of Prime Minister
Erdoğan. The AKP led a massive privatization campaign, with sales of government assets
totaling over $54 billion. Additionally, a new housing administration called TOKİ was
established to manage land sales and was placed under the control of the prime minister
shortly after the AKP assumed power, with the stated goal of “selling land for the
creation of quality public housing.”75
However, along with this massive campaign, transparency of public contracts has
fallen dramatically in recent years. Laws regarding public contracts and the sale of
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private lands passed by the AKP at the beginning of their rule were highly progressive
and transparent in order to satisfy the EU’s demands. Since 2007, however, they have
been amended dozens of times including the Public Procurement Law, making sales more
opaque.76 According to Global Source Partners, the government had already revised the
Public Tender Act 17 times. Additionally, more than 100 minor adjustments were made,
giving ministries more oversight in choosing contract winners and reducing
transparency. 77 For example, a set of alterations to the Procurement Law in 2008 allowed
the government to avoid the bidding process in situations where a certain company
displayed “unique competence.”78 Global Integrity, a corruption tracker, ranked Turkey
“weak” for transparency in 2010, down from “moderate” in 2007, noting the inability of
media and state prosecutors to follow corruption cases. 79
Transferring state resources to the private sector under opaque laws has offered
politicians ample opportunities to enrich their business allies. There have been increasing
numbers of allegations of obscure privatization bids, land sales, and government tenders
– mostly against businessmen with close ties to the government. Other times pro-AKP
companies have obtained no-bid contracts, while state banks have been pressured to grant
them generous loans. This was the case in Çalık Holding’s purchase of Sabah newspaper
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and the ATV television channel, which was bought with the aid of loans from two staterun banks.80
The relationship between the construction industry and the AKP is clear: ProAKP companies win the big government contracts. Favored companies of Erdoğan
include Çalık Holding, which used to be run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak,
and Cengiz İnşaat, which is run by Mehmet Cengiz, a founding member of a charity
foundation at Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University along with Erdoğan’s son. Cengiz
recently won the bid to build and operate Istanbul’s third airport for 25 years then transfer
it to the government. According to Aykut Erdoğdu, the bidding process for this airport
was switched from an open-bid model, where bidders and the public can see the entire
tender, to a closed envelope model in the week before the winner of the bid was to be
announced in May 2013.81

Corruption Scandal of December 17, 2013
The obscure dealings involving allies of Prime Minister Erdoğan have recently
been brought under the Turkish society’s light. On December 17, 2013, over 100 people
were arrested or questioned as a result of a 15-month secret investigation on graft,
ranging from bribes to bid rigging. Among the arrested were sons of three of Erdoğan’s
cabinet ministers; Süleyman Aslan, the CEO of Halkbank a state bank; and Ali Ağaoğlu,
one of the wealthiest men in Turkey due to his construction business. Millions of dollars
in cash were found in some of the homes of the accused, most notably Aslan, who had
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stashed $4.5 million in three shoeboxes. However, Erdoğan dismissed these
investigations as a plot by foreign sources to hinder Turkey’s economic progress.82
The December 17 corruption probe was made up of three separate investigations.
The first raid detained 32 people related to an investigation against Azeri businessman
Reza Zarrab. Zarrab was accused of paying bribes to the sons of Erdoğan’s cabinet
members and Halkbank CEO Aslan to enable and conceal illegal transactions of money
and gold between Turkey, Iran, and Russia, in addition to obtaining Turkish citizenship
for his relatives and his members of his alleged crime ring. Zarrab allegedly exchanged
gold for cash in Iran in 2012 with the support of top politicians and Halkbank, which
helped transfer a total of nearly $10 million of smuggled money. Halkbank was an ideal
choice because it had no existing divisions in the United States, preventing traces of
money transfers with Iran. 83
The second probe was related to several companies which took bribes for illegal
construction permits, causing tender rigging in the construction sector. Construction
tycoon Ali Ağaoğlu, several heads of TOKİ, and members of the Ministry of
Environment were detained as part of this second probe.84
The third probe was regarding Istanbul’s Fatih Municipality, which allegedly
granted construction permits despite safety issues for the newly built Marmaray tunnel
that would have arisen as a result of further construction. Additionally, Fatih
Municipality was also accused of giving permission to a gang to construct buildings on
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protected natural sites within the municipality’s borders. Fatih Mayor Mustafa Demir was
among the 32 people detained as part of the probe.85
However, since these arrests in December, all suspects have been released
according to court decisions, including the sons of the former ministers and Reza
Zarrab. 86

Implications of the Second Probe and TOKİ
The second probe has highlighted the linkages between corruption and
construction, symbolized by the “black box” of TOKİ. During the AKP’s rule, public
housing has rapidly expanded under TOKİ, the sole administration responsible for the
housing sector in Turkey. Erdoğan Bayraktar and Prime Minister Erdoğan had worked
together on construction since 1994, when Erdoğan was the mayor of Istanbul. When
Erdoğan’s AKP won its first parliamentary elections in 2002, Bayraktar was appointed to
direct TOKİ, allowing Erdoğan to turn the administration into a more powerful and less
accountable body, answering only to the prime minister himself. 87 TOKİ works with
private contractors to develop housing on public land, to which it has complete access,
and it also decides land prices. Its activities are also audited by the High Audit Board
(Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu), which is controlled by the office of the prime minister,
allowing for less transparency in its financial transactions. Moreover, Atiyas found in his
research that “TOKİ is exempt from the procurement rules which usually apply to public
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entities (specified in the Public Procurement Act). While this exemption was origianlly
limited to procurement for public housing projects, in 2011 it was extended to all
construction undertaken by TOKİ.”88
As a result of TOKİ’s extensive power to manage and redistribute land, TOKİ has
constructed over half a million buildings in the last decade. Figures reported by TOKİ
show that its land portfolio by the end of 2012 covered more than 118 million square
meters and that its real estate holdings were worth more than $7 billion. Bayraktar
managed TOKİ for more than nine years until his resignation, when he became the
Minister of Environment and Urban Planning during AKP’s third term.89 Aykut Erdoğdu,
an opposition member in parliament, has compiled a report on the TOKİ institution under
Bayraktar. He cites lack of transparency over revenue-sharing deals and rigged bidding
processes between TOKİ’s commercial branch, Emlak Konut, and private contractors,
such as KC Group.90 Erdoğdu also accuses TOKİ of corruption in seven separate projects
amounting to a total of $429.8 million. During the first investigation of the corruption
probe, Murat Kurum, chief executive of Emlak Konut, and construction tycoon Ağaoğlu
were detained for questioning, although both have now been released. 91
During the December 17 corruption probe, Bayraktar resigned from his position
along with the Interior Minister and the Economy Minister on December 25 after their
sons were implicated and taken into custody. In a shocking move, Bayraktar publicly
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invited the prime minister to resign with him, claiming that Erdoğan was behind most of
the construction plans mentioned in the corruption probe and had pressurized ministers to
execute his decisions. 92 The fact that corruption has been pervasive within TOKİ, an
administrative so closely linked to the government, demonstrates a failure of the
government to uphold the rule of law.

Prime Minister and Rule of Law
Since the corruption probes, a series of wiretapping recordings have constantly
been released on YouTube, revealing corruption within the office of the Prime Minister
himself. One recording leaked on February 24 is a series of phone calls between Erdoğan
and his son, Bilal, on the day the corruption graft began. In the recording, Erdoğan asks
his son to immediately transfer large amounts of money kept in the houses of various
family members. Later that day, Bilal calls his father reporting that most of the money
had been relocated, but 30 million euros still remained. In five days, this recording has
been listened to over 5 million times on YouTube. However, Erdoğan has denied all
allegations and says that it is clearly a montage.93
Corruption has pervaded Turkish politics and has severely undermined the rule of
law. Government officials have abused their power for private gain. If the government
cannot be accountable under the law, there can be no guarantee of democracy.
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VI. EXPLOITING A WEAK OPPOSITION

Despite its democratic structure, Turkey’s government has been dominated for
over a decade by a single party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and its leader,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The recent local elections that took place on the
30th of March demonstrate the domination of the AKP yet again, who won with 45
percent of the vote.94 Moreover, the clear victory of the AKP despite the recent
corruption charges, mass protests, and accusations of authoritarianism, indicates a
malaise within Turkey’s political system: the weakness of the opposition against the AKP.
Turkey’s democracy suffers from a lack of an effective opposition. Political
parties are essential to democracy as they are a means of representing and expressing the
needs of the citizens and provide policy choices that serve the best interest of the people.
A true democracy has multiple parties with real competition. Yet, Turkey’s absence of
effective political parties has resulted in a lack of incentive for reforms, hindering its
democratization process. Even more problematic is the fact that the Turkish civil society
movement has grown stronger over the years but does not view the alternate political
parties as representing their needs. Özler and Sarkissian argue that the weak interaction
between civil society organizations and political parties in Turkey due to increasing
polarization has undermined Turkey’s democratization process.95 This is one of the main
reasons why hundreds of thousands of Turks protested against the government last
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summer – with no alternative party to convey their grievances against the government,
people took to the streets in Taksim.
This chapter first explores the characteristics of the AKP-dominant party era, and
then it examines the reasons for the failure of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the
Republican People’s Party (CHP) to gather votes. The third part of this chapter looks at
the movement of Fethullah Gülen, which has become a major political force and source
of opposition to the AKP in the past decade.

Characteristics of the Turkish Party System
The party system since the 2002 elections demonstrates a number of important
characteristics. The most evident is the dominance of the AKP in Turkish electoral
politics, winning the parliamentary elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 by 34.3, 46.7 and
49.8 percent of the votes respectively. 96 Other parties have not even been close to
winning a majority in government over the past decade, excluding them from sharing
power.
The AKP’s control of the government has marginalized the parliamentary
political opposition. Moreover, there appears to be a shift in the ideological preferences
of Turkish voters from center-left to center-right. This has negatively impacted the ability
for Turkey’s main opposition party, the center-left CHP, to expand its electoral strength
to challenge the AKP in elections. Indeed, the CHP has continued to gain only about a
quarter of the voter share in the past three general elections.97 This sense of
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marginalization felt by its opponents has led to polarization not only in Turkey’s political
system but also among opposition-party voters, especially the educated, secular, middleclass who form the CHP’s electoral base. The prolonging AKP dominance has caused
certain social groups to feel increasingly alienated from the government, creating a sense
of hopelessness.
Third, Turkey has a 10 percent threshold for parties to gain seats in parliament,
which has notably diminished the number of parties represented in parliament. In 2002,
only the AKP and the CHP won seats in parliament. In 2007 and 2011, the MHP crossed
the threshold in addition to members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
(BDP) who ran as nominal independents.98 The high threshold used in elections adversely
affects smaller parties, especially the pro-Kurdish parties, from participating in politics.

The Failure of the Opposition
The 2014 local elections showed that the main opposition parties, the CHP and
MHP, remain to be parties of certain regions. The MHP could only win a few provinces
in the inner Anatolia region while the CHP continued to win the provinces that line
Turkey’s west coast, including its token province of Izmir. 99 This regional divide has
existed for the past decade, showing their inability to find a way to reach out beyond their
traditional base.
The reoccurring geographical divisions in Turkish elections emphasize the reason
why the two parties have been so unsuccessful: both parties have clear-cut identities that
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exclude parts of the Turkish population. The MHP is unable to go beyond its nationalistic
discourse to its audience, and it gives no hope for normalization since it adheres to its
ultranationalist policies. In addition to opposing EU accession, it adamantly excludes
parts of Turkey’s population based on ethnic issues – specifically, the Kurds. Because of
its national appeals, the party cannot be a credible alternative in the southeast of Turkey
which is predominantly Kurdish.100
The CHP, on the other hand, is Turkey’s first and the oldest party. It is a centerleft party that has largely represented Turkey’s urban, westernized, secular communities,
known for its enforcement of the Kemalist ideology. However, the Kemalist ideology is
becoming old-fashioned, losing appeal to the majority of Turkish society. During the
republican era, the CHP was associated with the modern coups and military tutelage
regime, known for its notorious regulations to impose Kemalism. In the past, the party
has also discriminated against the rights of different religious and ethnic sectors of
society, especially devout Muslims, who were accused of being a threat to the secular
state. As a result, it has traditionally been unable to attract more than about a quarter of
the votes. Their positioning has caused a void between the party and the predominantly
conservative population, reinforcing the polarization within society. 101 Ziya Öniş,
Professor of International Political Economy at Koç University, argues that one of the
central differences between the AKP and the CHP is that the AKP is able to appeal to a
broader range of Turkish society, whereas the CHP’s ideology makes it “inherently
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incompatible.”102 Moreover, the CHP’s reputation has been tarnished due to incessant
infighting and factionalism between the hardline Kemalists, who disapprove of the
AKP’s conservative agenda, and the reformers, who still hold secular values but are more
accommodating to ethnic and religious minorities. Trying to balance the two
interpretations of secularism has caused fragmentation within the CHP.103 Its internal
power struggles were worsened due to rivalries among leaders of the party, and its former
leader Deniz Baykal was forced to resign amid a scandal in 2010. 104
After the change in party leadership for the 2011 election, the CHP under Kemal
Kılıçdaroğlu has tried to pull away from Kemalism and has sought to reestablish the
party’s legacy of social democracy. Yet, the CHP has continued to perform poorly in
meeting the growing demand of Turkish society for reforms. Its proposals and projects
have been unrealistic in terms of resources, and the CHP has resorted to populist rhetoric
similar to that of the AKP to win the votes of the electorate. Moreover, the CHP has
tended to focus on discrediting the AKP by emphasizing and criticizing its failures rather
than propagating its own party agenda.105
Both the MHP and CHP’s failures to formulate new strategies and policies to
broaden their popular appeal continue to undermine their chances to present themselves
as a credible alternative to the AKP. The opposition needs to reformulate its discourse in
order to be more inclusive of other segments of Turkish society on the lines of ethnicity
and religion.
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The Gülen Movement
The Gülen movement is Turkey’s largest Islamic movement, following the
teachings of the retired cleric, Fethullah Gülen. The Gülen movement is an active force
with interests in the field of education, business, and media in Turkey as well as in over
one hundred countries around the world. Starting in Turkey as a network focused on
education, the Gülen movement expanded to other sectors and gained the support of
socially conservative entrepreneurs. In the early 1990s, Gülenists expanded their
education, media, and business initiatives abroad, consolidating a mass source of
income. 106 Joshua Hendrick describes in his recently published book that Gülen affiliates
have been “strategically ambiguous” in order to make mobilization around the world
more successful. As part of this strategy, Gülen-affiliated institutions have insisted that
each institution is independent from each other and that “there is no organic connection
between these institutions.”107 Indeed, the Fethullah Gülen movement has risen to be one
of the most important forces in Turkish politics, and their lack of transparency has led to
the development of conspiracy theories involving a hidden agenda.
Although it is not a formally-formed party opposition and actually denies any
political connections, the Gülen movement has in reality been an extremely significant
factor behind the AKP’s political success. Having both been formerly persecuted by the
military and the secular elite, the AKP and the Gülen movement created a tactical
alliance to curb the military’s role in politics. Moreover, the Gülen movement and the
AKP shared a similar long-term vision of rebuilding the Turkish state and society by
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“increasing the Muslim share in political, economic, and cultural power.”108 Thus, the
Gülen movement has endorsed and promoted the AKP through the Gülen-affiliated Feza
Media Group and its widely-read newspaper, Zaman, which has consistently sold more
than any other Turkish newspaper since 2007.109 More importantly, the AKP benefited
from the Gülenists who had infiltrated the Turkish bureaucracy, primarily the police force
and the judiciary, in order to protect itself from the military. The AKP’s access to the
bureaucracy greatly increased its power and control, facilitating its efforts to weaken the
opposition as demonstrated by the Ergenekon trials.110
However, this alliance with the AKP has progressively weakened and soured over
recent years, and the Gülen movement has increasingly been challenging AKP’s authority.
The first signs of tension appeared in June 2010, when Gülen and the AKP disagreed
over sending a flotilla to aid the Gaza Strip, which was blocked by the Israeli navy.
Ankara approved the initiative led by the İHH, a Turkish aid agency with close ties to the
AKP, resulting in the deaths of nine Turks by Israeli soldiers. While the Turkish
government glorified the Turkish “martyrs” and withdrew its ambassadors from Israel,
Gülen criticized the campaign in the Wall Street Journal for unlawfully challenging
Israel’s state leadership. 111
The movement’s dissension with the government continued, and it took the
opportunity to use its affiliates within media, security, and judicial institutions to
pressurize the government. Through its own media channels, it attacked Erdoğan for his
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foreign policy positions – including its stance on Egypt, Iran, and Israel. However, their
disagreement over the Kurdish issue led to a breaking point, as Gülen is in favor of
granting the Kurds larger cultural freedoms. On February 2012, the state prosecutor
decided to interrogate Hakan Fidan, the head of the Turkish National Intelligence
Organization (MİT), for illegally negotiating with Kurdish parties. This was a direct
challenge to Erdoğan as Fidan directly reports to Erdoğan, who now saw himself as the
potential target for a charge of high treason. The AKP retaliated by introducing a bill that
amended the MİT personnel law, offering comprehensive legal immunity for intelligence
officials. 112
Erdoğan took this opportunity to publicly define the Gülen movement as a “state
within a state” carrying out anti-government schemes.113 This perception was also fueled
by the Ergenekon trials. The AKP had closely cooperated with Gülenists within the
security forces and the judiciary to investigate the Ergenekon conspiracies, but the AKP
also began to fear the Gülenists’ spreading influence in the bureaucratic system. A strong
sense of distrust and fear of the movement began to develop.
In November 2013, the government made its biggest move against the Gülen yet:
a bill to close private preparatory schools in Turkey. The Gülen movement owns about a
quarter of these schools, which provides a significant source of income.114 The bill passed
in late February of this year, ordering the closure of nearly 4,000 preparatory schools by
September 1, 2015.115 Adding to this outbreak, daily Taraf leaked a document from a
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2004 National Security Council (MGK) meeting, revealing that the government had made
future plans to clampdown on the Gülen movement and its activities. 116
The Gülen movement retaliated swiftly: On December 17, Zekeriya Öz, an
Istanbul prosecutor who was in charge of the Ergenekon trials and is widely believed to
be affiliated to the Gülen movement, initiated the corruption raid on dozens of individuals.
The timing of the announcement of this 15-month investigation suspiciously points to the
Gülen movement’s involvement. Since the beginning of this corruption probe, the AKP
blames the “parallel state,” in reference to the Gülen movement, of trying to undermine
the AKP government through the corruption probe, despite their denial of any
involvement.117 The government responded by purging and transferring thousands of
police officers from posts in big cities including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, in addition
to reassigning nearly 200 prosecutors and judges.118
In the latest news, the Turkish Parliament approved a law increasing the powers
and immunities of the MİT, allowing it to monitor and investigate foreign operations.119
The MİT bill can be viewed as a defensive mechanism against the other security organs
and the judiciary, signifying Erdoğan’s suspicions and lack of trust in these institutions.
The prime minister has accused the Gülen movement of orchestrating the December 17
investigations and the wiretapping leaks to undermine the AKP. With the new bill, the
MİT will be able to profile members of the bureaucracy to find these perpetrators and
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spies allegedly part of the Gülen movement. Erdoğan has directly hit the heart of the
Gülen movement.

With the absence of an effective opposition, there is also an absence of checks
and balances. The AKP’s extraordinary electoral success appears to have resulted in
over-confidence, which is reflected by its increasing control over Turkish institutions and
civil society. The AKP has progressively been less willing to tolerate opposition from
different segments of the population, and this has serious implications for Turkey’s
democratic backsliding.
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VII. CURBING CIVIL LIBERTIES

In October 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan lifted the controversial, decades-old
headscarf ban as part of a reform package by the government meant to improve
democracy. It was a rare moment of advocating for personal freedom. In reality, Erdoğan
has been adopting a more authoritarian stance and has been interfering more and more in
the daily lives of Turkish citizens. Having already reformed Turkey’s institutions at a
macro-level, Erdoğan has continued to press on into the micro-level by imposing his
choice of morality and lifestyle on Turkish society, to the extent that it is infringing on
Turkish citizens’ rights. Many have framed this micromanaging in terms of secular and
religious tensions, as they accuse the AKP of attempting to reshape Turkish society along
more Islamic lines. However, the tension is much broader than religious conservatism.
Rather, the core of the issue is the authoritarian way in which the elected government is
exercising its authority, despite its duty to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms for
all Turkish citizens.
This chapter is organized by the different areas which have been micromanaged
by the government since 2011, when AKP won its third term. These developments
affecting the lifestyles of Turkish citizens have been frequent but have usually been
scattered and disconnected from one another. However, as a whole, they have great
political significance, as demonstrated by the Gezi Protests during the summer of 2013.
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Sale of Alcohol
During the past four years, the AKP has gradually pushed towards banning the
sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. In 2010, there was a sudden 45 percent tax
increase on alcoholic beverages. 120 The next year, the Turkish Tobacco and Alcohol
Market Regulatory Authority issued a regulation forbidding liquor companies from
sponsoring advertising campaigns or sport events. Additionally, the same regulation
banned the sale of tobacco and alcoholic products from vending machines. 121 Finally, in
May 2013, an alcohol ban was passed: shops are prohibited from selling or displaying
alcohol in windows between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., restaurants within 100 meters of
schools or mosques are forbidden to sell alcohol, and liquor companies are further
restricted in advertising and sponsoring events.122 In April of this year, Hurriyet Daily
News published that Anadolu Efes, Turkey’s biggest brewer, is to shut down a production
facility due to declining sales, which has declined about 15 to 20 percent since the new
alcohol ban.123 Despite the fact that statistics show that only six percent of Turkish
households consume alcohol,124 Erdoğan has cited health and safety of youth as
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justification for the alcohol ban, insisting the aim is to stop young Turks from “wandering
about in a state of inebriation.”125

Conduct of Women’s Private Lives
Recently, the government has reiterated statements from 2008, recommending
that women have at least three children. At a summit in Ankara, Erdoğan said, “One or
two children mean bankruptcy. Three children mean we are not improving but not
receding either. So, I repeat, at least three children are necessary in each family.”126
Thousands of women and activists protested throughout the country when
Erdoğan brought the issue of abortion to public debate in May 2012. Calling abortion
“murder,” Erdoğan tried to pass a bill that would slash the time limit for abortions. Since
1983, abortion was legal up to the tenth week of pregnancy. Turkey has a 14.8 percent
abortion rate compared to 18.9 percent in the United States, according to a 2011 United
Nations Population Division study. In addition to abortion, Erdoğan sought to restrict the
number of births by caesarean section, a practice which has increased to more than 45
percent in 2011, according to the Turkish Health Ministry. 127 However, the Turkish
government has temporarily dropped plans for the controversial bill. 128
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Education and Dorms
In March 2012, the AKP passed a controversial school bill that changed the
structure of compulsory education. The bill increases compulsory education from eight to
twelve years, dividing the twelve years into three tiers, hence the term, “4+4+4.” By
adding an additional four years, students in the middle tier are now allowed to attend the
religious “imam-hatip” schools rather than have to wait till after high school. Moreover,
the bill added two new elective subjects to the general curriculum after the first tier of
four years called “The Qur’an” and “The Life of the Prophet Muhammad,” introducing a
more Islamic component to education. 129 Though this bill has highlighted Turkey’s longestablished tensions between religion and secularism, it can also be viewed as the
government’s way of imposing its own views onto Turkish society; in this case, a
reflection of Erdoğan’s deep religiosity.
In November 2013, Erdoğan sparked another public debate and received a lot of
criticism when he condemned shared housing between male and female students in
university dorms operated by state or private group houses. He defended potential
government intervention by stating that mixed-student housing encourages depravity,
drug trafficking, prostitution, and terrorism. 130 The next day, Radikal published a story
that a student’s house was raided by the police. 131 However, government officials,
particularly Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, have taken an opposite stance against
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Erdoğan over the issue of mixed-gender student housing, almost leading to Arınç’s own
resignation. This also led to student demonstrations, denouncing the interference of the
government in private life. 132

Internet Control
The internet has rapidly expanded to become a central mode of communication
and accessibility of information. However, the AKP has put a lot of effort in keeping
opposing opinions under control by limiting access to certain websites, starting with a
YouTube ban in March 2007 when the Turkish courts banned the site due to video clips
insulting Atatürk. YouTube was blocked sporadically until it was permanently lifted in
2010.133
During the AKP’s rule, thousands of websites have been blocked, including gay
dating sites and news portals considered to be propaganda tools of Kurdish militants.
Google reported last December that during the first six months of 2012, Turkish
authorities have requested Google to delete nearly ten times more content from its sites
than before. Subsequently in the next year, Google was asked to remove more than
12,000 items, making Turkey the top country to remove Google’s content.134
After the corruption probe in December 2013, the AKP stepped up its efforts to
control internet sites in order to prevent social media from reporting on the scandal. On
February 18, President Abdullah Gül signed a new Internet law, claiming it was a
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necessary measure to protect personal privacy. The Internet law enables authorities to
block access to web pages without a prior court order, in addition to collecting users’
browsing histories.135
In the latest blow to Turkey’s democracy, the Turkish government blocked both
Twitter and YouTube in March days before the Turkish 2014 local elections. In recent
weeks, audio recordings have been released via Twitter and YouTube on an almost daily
basis, alleged to be telephone conversations between senior government officials and
businessmen that reveal corruption. The YouTube ban came as an immediate response to
another leak exposing a discussion on the possibility of going to war with Syria.136 The
prime minister’s office announced, “Twitter has been used as a means to carry out
systematic character assassinations by circulating illegally acquired recordings, fake and
fabricated records of wiretapping.”137
After the AKP won the local elections in a landslide victory, the Turkish
Constitutional Court lifted the Twitter ban, ruling it as contrary to fundamental rights and
freedom of expression. A court in Ankara also lifted a ban on YouTube, though as of
April 10, access to YouTube remains blocked.138
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Implications of the Gezi Park Protests
This chapter concludes with the events of the Gezi Park protests, which best
capture the resistance to the growing authoritarian AKP and the violation of fundamental
rights, including the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. It began in
late May when a group of environmentalists initiated a peaceful sit-in in response to the
government’s proposed development project in Gezi Park, one of the last green spaces in
Istanbul. The project included the construction of a replica nineteenth century Ottoman
barracks, a shopping mall, and a mosque. On May 28, 2013, the police arrived and broke
up the group using excessive force. In a few days, the police launched a raid against the
growing number of protesters using tear gas, pepper spray, excessive violence, and water
cannons. As news spread across the country, protests grew into a mass anti-government
mobilization, spanning to the cities of Ankara and Izmir. By mid-June, hundreds of
thousands had participated in the “Gezi Park protests.”139
The tactics employed by security forces across Turkey during the Gezi protests
demonstrate the government's violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. First, the
government violated the freedom of assembly as it allowed the police to disperse
peaceful protests through indiscriminate and excessive use of tear gas and force. Police
also used water cannons and plastic bullets against protesters. In addition to use of force,
the police have detained a number of individuals, including doctors treating the injured
and lawyers defending protesters’ rights, who were subjected to arbitrary and abusive use
of force. The police repeatedly showed intolerance for any form of protest, including
passive forms, such as what became known as the “standing man” protests where
139
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protesters stood alone in silence in Taksim Square. However, rather than stopping the
police abuse, the government sided against the protesters, condemning social media sites
such as Twitter and Facebook that were being used to provide live coverage and spread
the news by protestors and their supporters.140 According to a Turkish human rights
organization, there were eight deaths as a result of the protests, 8,163 injured, 5,300
individuals arrested, 160 kept in long-term detention, and many arbitrarily detained
without charge for hours.141
Secondly, the government violated freedom of expression. The protests sparked
an intense period of pressure for media workers in Turkey as the government and media
bosses clamped down on journalists attempting to report on the protests. As a result of
their coverage of the Gezi Park protests, 22 journalists have been fired and 37 forced to
quit, according to the Journalists Union of Turkey.142 The mainstream national media
broadcasted little of the protest. CNN Türk’s decision to screen a documentary on
penguins during the initial stages of the protests became a symbol of self-censorship in
the national media. 143
The Gezi protests was a new phenomenon in Turkey and vividly illustrates the
tensions within Turkish society and its dissatisfaction with the Turkish government. In a
commentary in Insight Turkey, Ete says that protesters take to the street when they feel
helpless and defeated – a response when they see no alternative. Ete argues that this was
the case in the Gezi protests, where protesters’ motivation was purely reactionary, as
140
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evident in slogans such as “Enough.” The protesters were demonstrating to defend their
lifestyles and prevent future policies that could further restrict their freedoms.144
Similarly, Tayfun Atay, a professor at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, says
that the demonstrations must be analyzed in the context of the AKP’s recent actions in
Turkey, describing it as a “period of construction” when the AKP intensified its own
morality in daily life and the secular public space.145 A survey conducted during the
protests confirms these points. Ninety percent of responders answered that they were
protesting on the streets because they were “disturbed by and unhappy with the
authoritarian discourse and attitude of Prime Minister Erdoğan.” Eighty-five percent also
agreed that the AKP had been increasingly interfering in people’s lives. 146
The nationwide protests were aggravated by the authorities’ aggressive
crackdown on the initial peaceful protests in Gezi Park, denying them the right to
peaceful protest altogether. Yet, the underlying force behind the demonstrations was
rooted in the fears and despair of the secular people about the increasing government
pressure and interference in their personal lifestyles. The AKP failed to pass this major
test for its commitment to Turkey’s democracy and its commitment to upholding
fundamental human rights.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey is a crucial ally for the west and for democracy, making Turkey’s
democratic backslide a critical case study. Its internal affairs will affect its ability to
engage with other international actors, many of which have a vital interest in seeing a
democratic Turkey that can cooperate on strategic issues. Democratic backsliding in
Turkey can also have major implications for nondemocratic countries, as the situation in
Turkey may halt the democratizing processes in its neighboring countries in the Middle
East and North Africa, which have looked to Turkey as a source of democratic inspiration.
Most importantly however, democratic backsliding may lead to increasing oppression of
the Turkish people, denying them universal human rights and freedoms.
The Turkish case helps identify areas which need to be carefully observed and
monitored to prevent backsliding in other countries experiencing decline. Signs of
erosion of the highlighted five key areas should serve as a warning that requires an
immediate response. Yet, each case of democratic backsliding will differ according to the
country, and both preventative and corrective measures will also be country specific.
Turkey has already passed initial signs of backsliding and is gradually picking up
speed in its decline. This chapter provides policy recommendations specific to the
Turkish case in order to prevent further democratic backsliding. Turkey’s democratic
allies, specifically the United States and the European Union, can play an important role
in encouraging and facilitating the process towards reversing Turkey’s course back to the
right one. Both the U.S. and the EU have a genuine interest in seeing a democratic
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Turkey, and thus, they should keep Turkey close and continue to directly and actively
engage Turkish leaders.

The United States
Turkey has been an important American partner, especially in the Middle East. As
NATO allies, the U.S.-Turkey alliance has long centered on cooperation over issues
related to security and defense. However, these relations have deteriorated over the past
several years as Turkey embraced an independent outlook which has tended to clash with
Washington’s policy, including Turkey’s stance on Israel and its support for extremist
groups in Syria. As democratic elements begin to deteriorate in Turkey, the United States
needs to adopt a policy that addresses the reality of current events in Turkey rather than
ignoring and denying Turkey’s increasing authoritarianism. In the past, Washington has
only released statements of concern over Turkey’s situation – but this is not enough. The
U.S. needs to directly address Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül and
explain how Turkey’s democratic decline has been damaging relations and undermining
joint efforts to achieve common goals. In addition to vocalizing concerns, the U.S. can
further support Turkey’s democracy in the following ways:


Work collaboratively in establishing a longer-term Turkish policy that focuses on
the stability of Turkey’s political institutions and freedom of its society. Their
bilateral relationship should not only be centered on security and economic issues,
but should integrate human rights and democracy as a basis for their partnership.
U.S. and Turkish government officials should hold regular meetings to discuss
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and implement ways to improve democratic elements in Turkey, including
transparency in the government and open dialogue with media and civil society.


Use economic incentives to push for greater government accountability and
transparency. The U.S. and the EU should use the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) as a way to expand opportunities in Turkey,
including increasing free trade and allowing Turkey to participate in TTIP
negotiations. Turkey’s customs union with the EU means that Turkey has high
interests in the outcome of the TTIP; yet, Turkey has been denied a say in its
implementation. Both the U.S. and the EU should find ways to include Turkey
into this economic integration project.147

The worst thing the U.S. can do is to isolate Turkey as punishment for its current
domestic situation and specific political decisions. Rather, as an ally, Washington should
offer advice both publicly and privately. However, it must consider the high levels of
anti-Americanism within Turkey. According to Pew Research, an average of 75 percent
have viewed the U.S. “unfavorably” in the past eleven years. 148 Though antiAmericanism in Turkey has generally derived from specific U.S. foreign policies,
especially from the post 9/11 era,149 Erdoğan has been exploiting anti-American
sentiment for domestic political reasons. He has instigated conspiracy theories by
accusing external sources, including the U.S., for provoking and causing Turkey’s
internal problems. These conspiracy theories have been gaining traction in Turkey, as
147
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Erdoğan’s rhetoric has consistently framed the increasing number of domestic turmoil as
a dark international conspiracy against Turkey and AKP rule. Though the Gülen
movement has been the primary target for such conspiracies, Erdoğan has also targeted
international actors, blaming western media, the EU, and the U.S. for being behind the
Gezi protests.150 After the December 17 corruption probe, Erdoğan said in a speech in the
town of Fatsa, “There are extremely dirty alliances in this set-up, dark alliances that
cannot tolerate the new Turkey, the big Turkey...Turkey has never been subjected to such
an immoral attack.”151 Erdoğan hinted at the direct involvement of the U.S. in the probes
by claiming that “some ambassadors have been engaging in provocative actions…we do
not have to keep you in our country.” 152 Erdoğan’s rhetoric has further inflamed antiAmericanism in Turkey through his support of conspiracy theories to divert domestic
criticism from his leadership to external sources. This makes it even more crucial that the
U.S. is careful not to antagonize or provoke further anti-Americanism by threatening or
punishing the Turkish government for decisions that clash with Washington’s interests.

The European Union
Though the European Union’s leverage diminished as accession talks stalled, the
EU can still be an important actor in encouraging important reforms in Turkey. In the
past, the possibility of EU membership served as a huge impetus for Turkey’s
150
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democratization process.153 Yet, as the EU loses credibility in membership negotiations,
Turkey’s interest in the union is fading, constraining the ability of both sides to better
cooperate in political and economic issues.
Despite the stalling of accession talks, the EU and Turkey should continue the
process of harmonization, which can reinvigorate Turkey’s push for reforms. Recently
there has been a resumption of negotiations, including the “positive agenda” which
commenced in May 2012, the opening of a new chapter of the acquis last year, and the
recent agreement to pursue visa liberalization. 154 The EU must continue to engage with
Turkey while offering economic incentives to support Turkey’s democracy. Like the U.S.,
the EU must clearly state the negative consequences of democratic backsliding to
prospective EU membership and Turkey’s economy. Some of the steps the EU can
undertake include:


Complete the visa liberalization process that would allow Turkish citizens to
travel visa-free to the EU in exchange for Turkey readmitting illegal migrants
from the EU. Opening up travel to the EU is a huge incentive for Turkey and
should be swiftly implemented.155



Correct the imbalance in the EU-Turkey customs union. Though Turkey is
obligated to abide by the EU’s commercial policies, it does not have a say in the
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policy negotiations. Turkey should be included in these economic negotiations,
including the TTIP.156


Target the Turkish youth through EU programs such as the Erasmus student
exchange program. These programs will strengthen Turkey’s civil society and
foster liberal democracy, raising future leaders who have visions of Turkish
democracy.



Renew impetus on accession negotiations. The EU should incentivize Turkey’s
accession progress by providing a clear, dual conditionality accepted by both
sides, laying the conditions for future ratification under EU criteria. As a first step,
the EU should release the official criteria for opening more chapters of the
accession acquis, especially chapters 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights and
chapter 24 on justice, freedom, and security, which has been suggested by both
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Turkey’s Foreign Minister
Davutoglu. 157 This will lead to much-needed reforms in those critical areas.

However, the EU should not completely lose its credibility with the membership
process or else it will cause further isolation from Turkey. If the EU is unwilling to offer
Turkey membership in the long-run, it should offer a new partnership structure to Turkey
in order to overcome this possible drift. Sinan Ülgen offers a framework where Turkey
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can be offered “virtual EU membership.”158 Though virtual membership would mean that
Turkey lacks the right to vote, it would be better than no membership at all. Turkey will
be allotted some decision-making power and will be consulted in various EU committees.
This will deepen cooperation and integration in areas such as mobility, trade,
environment, and foreign and security policy. The EU is not cohesive in that some
member states are already given special status due to opt-outs that choose to apply only
certain EU policies. For example, the UK has opted out of the Schengen Area and
Denmark has withdrawn from the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. 159 Thus, it
is a real possibility that Turkey can also be given a special status.

Turkey
As Turkey tries to gain more regional influence, it has been more independent and
detached from its allies. Moreover, its pride and ambitions may prevent it from
completely and candidly engaging with its allies, despite their offer to help. Nevertheless,
democracy can only be truly built by internal dynamics, depending on the leaders and
citizens who need to demonstrate strong support and commitment for the idea.
However, despite the local elections that were seen as a confidence vote for
Erdoğan’s leadership, the results reinforce the existence of a huge obstacle within
Turkish society: the extreme polarization of the Turkish people, which is divided between
those who support Erdoğan and the AKP, and those who do not. This polarization, which
158
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is deeply rooted in Turkish political and social life, hinders Turkey’s democratization
process. There are many elements to this polarization, including secularism versus
religion, authoritarianism versus democracy, the emergence of the powerful Anatolian
business and political elite, and the weakening of the traditional Kemalist bureaucratic
elite. 160 The animosity and hostility between these two sides has begun to reach its peak,
undermining prospects of a healthy democracy. Thus, polarization is one of the main
areas the government needs to address. A relatively easy starting point for the
government is to refrain from using polarizing rhetoric and discourse. Erdoğan’s rhetoric
and actions have greatly contributed to reinforcing splits within Turkish society.
Moreover, the government needs to transcend Turkey’s polarized society and engage
with Turkey’s opposition parties and civil society groups. It should be tolerant and open
to all, taking a conciliatory and inclusive stance. The government’s policies should aim to
improve Turkey as a nation rather than achieve its own personal agenda.
Likewise, the opposition needs to cease contributing to polarization as well,
particularly the CHP which has primarily used tactics of insulting the AKP to gain
supporters. The opposition is weak, and it needs to become more effective and
constructive. It can do this by focusing more on the needs of the Turkish people rather
than simply winning elections and defeating the AKP. In addition to political parties,
other civil society groups need to stop confronting the government, primarily the Gülen
movement. Their anti-democratic rivalry is undermining Turkey’s democracy, and the
Gülen movement needs to return its attention and resources back to its original sphere
and responsibilities as a social movement rather than a political one.
160
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In addition to addressing Turkey’s polarization issues, the government can further
strengthen Turkey’s democracy by doing the following:


Allow the press to operate free of government intimidation. The government must
immediately stop all tactics to suppress media freedoms and should refrain from
punishing critics of the government.



Maintain separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive branch.
With the executive’s recent attempts at grabbing control over the judiciary, the
executive has used the courts to prosecute its own opposition on many occasions.
In order to properly uphold the rule of law, the judiciary needs to remain
independent and separate from the Ministry of Justice.



Abolish the Anti-Terror Law and Article 301. The vague terms of the former
allows a liberal application of the law, which has already resulted in numerous
prosecutions and convictions of innocent people for terrorism, including
independent journalists. Article 301 of the criminal code criminalizes “insulting
the Turkish nation.”161 This too has been used too liberally, resulting in the
prosecution of government critics.



Address corruption in the public procurement and privatization processes. In light
of the December 17 corruption probes, there is a widespread distrust of the
government. The government needs to improve transparency of public
procurement in order to restore its image and the support of Turkish citizens. It
should review and improve the housing system, including TOKİ.
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Another crucial issue Turkey needs to address is its economy, which is suffering
immensely from the political crisis. The record-low depreciation of the Turkish lira and
the decreasing value of the Turkish stock market over the past few months have led to
fears of a slowdown in foreign direct investment. Turkey has heavily depended on its
stable lira and international connections for areas in trade, investment, research and
technology, education, and security, and downgrades by rating agencies can pose serious
challenges.162 Thus, the government needs to focus on its economy while keeping its
relations with partner countries by amending domestic issues to reassure international
markets. Moreover, this is an extremely important issue for the AKP itself because its
economic problems are causing dissatisfaction within the rising business elites, who have
emerged under AKP rule. These business elites depend on alliances with foreign
businesses and on Turkey’s standing in international markets – if this fails, the AKP will
lose a major group of supporters.
In summary, the challenges of constructing and defending a democratic state are
fundamentally ones the Turkish people must resolve.
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IX. CONCLUSION

It is clear that Turkey has not yet completed the democratic consolidation
expected by the international community. Rather, Turkey’s democratic successes are
quickly unraveling, and Turkey is becoming increasingly authoritarian and unstable. If
Turkey’s democratic backsliding is not checked, its hard-earned image that it has built
over the last decades will be completely dismantled. This paper demonstrates the
sequential effects of democratic backsliding in Turkey. Turkey is deteriorating quickly in
a whirl of events, thus making it important to take a step back and identify wider trends.
The events and steps taken by the government are not independent, exclusive events, but
are inherently intertwined and connected to each other, where each authoritarian action
has negative consequences leading to further backsliding. Like a domino effect, when one
area falls under executive control, it affects other areas, inevitably causing them to also
succumb to authoritarian control. The domino effect appears to be gaining momentum as
demonstrated by the increasing number of evidence of democratic backsliding this past
year. By fitting and analyzing these events in a timeline framework, the following
characterizations of the democratic backsliding trend in Turkey can be made:

1) Erdogan’s tendency to reduce democracy to the number of votes has given him
the confidence to take authoritarian measures. A timeline of events shows that the
first major signs of democratic backsliding occurred after the AKP’s reelection in 2007.
As the AKP was intent in its first elections to prove to the Turkish people its commitment
to create a new Turkey, it made huge efforts to fulfill its democratic promises and
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transform the Turkish economy. Its achievements led to its victory in the 2007 elections.
However, this reelection gave the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan a boost in
confidence, opening up an opportunity to stray away from democratic commitments and
pursue other ambitions. Thus, since 2007, Erdoğan took the first steps in shaking
democratic structures, seen by judicial reforms, the Ergenekon trials, and the clampdown
on the Doğan Media Group. The AKP’s third reelection in 2011 clinched Erdoğan’s
confidence by making the results clear: the opposition was weak and the AKP was strong.
Erdoğan had unlimited power. Erdoğan has had a tendency to reduce democracy to
elections, reflected in his speech during the Gezi Park protests, “If you gather 100,000
people, I can gather a million.”163 Thus, as Erdoğan keeps on winning the votes, he
becomes more self-assured of his actions and justifies them as legitimate.

2) Media clampdowns have generally been a response by the government to deal
with other domestic crises. The media chapter describes many different tactics the
government has employed to suppress the media’s independent role. When analyzing the
sequential timing of these clampdowns, the government has generally acted against the
media as an immediate response to events that threaten the interests of the government.
The government realizes the media’s ability to incite further opposition and attack the
AKP’s image, and thus, the government’s natural reaction has been to lash out at the
media every time. This trend has been seen time after time. The Deniz Feneri incident
abroad ultimately led Doğan Media Group to sell its anti-government newspapers to a
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pro-government group, the Ergenekon trials led to the arrest of journalists who spoke out
against the government, and the Gezi protests led to mass firings of journalists and news
editors. Media clampdown in Turkey has been facilitated by the government’s attempts to
deal with its other opposition conflicts.

3) The sequential events and effects are characterized by tit-for-tat exchanges within
a polarized Turkish society, facilitating democratic backsliding. This “tit-for-tat”
exchange with the government can mainly be seen with the judiciary and the Gülen
movement. The Turkish Constitutional Court has traditionally been dominated by
hardline secularists who have been trying to protect Turkish society from the
authoritarian actions of the government. The Constitutional Court and the AKP have
clashed numerous times, the first major incident occurring in 2007 when it tried to ban
the AKP. Since then, the AKP has revamped its efforts to gain control over the judiciary.
The Constitutional Court, however, has continued to play an independent role in recent
months, ruling the recent Twitter ban as unconstitutional and also repealing the law
restricting the independence of the HSYK. This will only prompt the AKP to devise new
plans to suppress the independence of the Court.
The tension between the Gülen movement and the AKP has intensified in recent
years. The movement to close the preparatory schools at the end of last year has caused
the Gülen movement to take retaliatory measures, including the corruption probe against
the government. The government swiftly responded by cracking down on the police and
the judiciary, which are mainly composed of Gülenists. These tit-for-tat exchanges have
only contributed to Turkey’s democratic backsliding as each side refuses to absorb the
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last blow. The AKP will continue to take undemocratic measures to suppress opposition
elements.

However, one extremely important area that has not yet been covered is Turkish
foreign policy and its relationship to Turkey’s democratic backsliding. Turkey’s domestic
problems appear to be having negative reverberating effects on its foreign policy,
identifying an area which requires further research: the impact of democratic backsliding
on a country’s foreign policy. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu wrote in a
Foreign Policy article, “Without a stable domestic order that meets its citizens’ demands
for liberties, after all, Turkey cannot pursue a proactive foreign-policy agenda abroad.”164
Indeed, the domestic crisis at home is reflected in Turkey’s failing foreign policy, which
has been inconsistent and marked by a distinct lack of coherence.
Domestic turmoil has become a distraction to Turkish foreign policy. As the
government tried to find a way to respond to the Gezi Park protests and the corruption
probes, it could not focus on its foreign policy. These backward steps away from
democratic consolidation have impacted Turkey’s bid to the EU, and Turkey will need to
find a way to get back on track if it ever hopes to acquire EU membership. Yet, in the
process of handling these domestic problems, the AKP has also made allegations that
foreign powers are behind the recent domestic crises. Not only has Erdoğan accused the
involvement of Gülen, but he has also referred to Israel and the U.S. as instigators. This
has only damaged the relationship with the U.S. and worsened the already-broken
relationship with Israel.
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The more obvious link between Turkey’s failing foreign policy to its domestic
problems at home is that democratic backsliding has caused it to stray away from the
support of democratic countries of the west. Turkey has taken increasingly bold,
unilateral actions, which have not only come at odds with the policies of the U.S., but
have backfired, leading to failed results. This is especially seen in Turkey’s approach to
the Arab Spring, where Erdoğan enthusiastically supported the Islamist Sunni political
movements. In Libya, Turkey was hesitant to endorse a NATO operation, but it finally
relented and became a passive player in the process. In Egypt, Turkey was a firm
supporter of the elected President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.
However, Morsi was overthrown by the military on July 3, 2013, leaving Erdoğan with
the image of supporting the wrong side. The situation with Syria is worse. Relations with
Turkey and Syria had improved under Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors”
strategy. Yet, the Arab uprisings that spread to Syria threatened this relation. Turkey tried
to convince President Assad to address the protestors’ concerns, but was completely
ignored. In response, Turkey condemned Assad and took a very fierce stance against his
regime, leading to seriously deteriorated relations. Since then, Turkey has been involved
in assisting the opposition through supplying training, weapons, and even finances.
Turkey has also allegedly been supporting extremist groups in Syria, including Al-Qaedarelated elements, as was revealed after a bomb attack in Reyhanli, a town in southern
Turkey. 165 The chaotic nature of Turkey’s foreign policy has been reinforced by further
conspiracy theories at home, including the recent YouTube leaks that revealed
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discussions of a potential military intervention into Syria, and journalist Seymour Hersh’s
wild claim that Turkey was responsible for the sarin gas attacks in Syria.166
There is a parallel between the government’s policies at home and abroad.
Democratic backsliding is marked by the executive’s grabs for control. Likewise, the
resulting failing foreign policy is marked by a unilateral, imperialist nature rather than a
multilateral approach. Thus, Turkey and the U.S. have consistently been at odds over
their policy towards the Middle East, and Turkey now risks isolation. A Turkey
committed to democracy would look towards the U.S. and Europe and strengthen its
democratic allies instead of extending its authoritarian nature to the international sphere.
Moreover, it is important to note that Turkey’s ability to influence the rest of the Arab
world is dependent on its own democracy. Turkey must be able to overcome its own
democratic problems; otherwise, it clearly undermines Turkey’s model for
democratization in other countries and its regional standing in the Arab world.

It is a paradox that the same party that has helped democratize Turkey is the same
party that is facilitating its backsliding. The recent local elections in March only
demonstrated that Erdoğan is unbeatable and that the process to halting democratic
backsliding will be extremely long and difficult. The AKP’s authoritarian tendencies are
a reflection of the character of Erdoğan himself, making the future of Erdoğan crucial to
the future path of Turkey. Thus, with Erdoğan’s ambitions to become president, the
future of Turkey is far from certain. Can Erdoğan succeed in winning this summer’s
presidential elections? If he does, will he centralize all power in the office of the
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president? What will this mean for the future of the AKP if it loses its leader and its
driving force?
Turkey’s democracy has matured beyond the point of passively accepting
Erdoğan’s version of a democracy, where election votes are enough to legitimize his rule.
Erdoğan is losing legitimacy every time he challenges the rule of law, civil liberties, and
transparency in policymaking, and the instability in Turkey can no longer be appeased
simply by winning elections. Discontent in Turkish society will not simply disappear,
even if Erdoğan’s AKP wins the next general elections scheduled for 2015. Turkey can
only make its full democratic transition when it understands that democratic legitimacy
goes beyond the ballot box and it makes a genuine commitment to rebuild a liberal
democracy. It needs to make a commitment now to prevent further democratic
backsliding and needs to find a way to muddle out of the mess it has created. The success
of reversing this decline primarily depends on the will and determination of the leaders
and citizens of Turkey, and it is up to them to leave a legacy of consolidating democracy.
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